Indeed, the worst of the reporting on this issue is a description of HOW the forces will be redeployed; instead, the media concentrates on what effects this might have on the Germans. The Germans are not under threat of attack by conventional forces and Germany is not as close to the likely frontlines of the next major conflict. That is why moving mobile forces to Hungary, Romania and Turkey makes sense -- as the NY Times might be able to tell, those three countries are closer to the Middle East and the Caucasus than Germany.
Before today, there were three major notable opinion pieces about this issue. The first is Ronald Asmus's op-ed from Wednesday's WaPo. Asmus is a former assistant deputy secdef from the Clinton administration. He takes the (most recent) Kerry line. His piece is here and the Vodkapundit shreds it here; Dale Franks fisks it here.
Second, is Douglas Feith's op-ed in Thursday's WaPo here. Feith is the current undersecretary of defense for policy.
Third, is David Englin's piece at The New Republic (web only, may require registration). Here is what I said about it in a comment on QandO (I've corrected the spelling of Englin's name for this post, I spelled it "Anglin" in the comment = old friend from college was an Anglin):
I just read Englin's piece at lunchtime. Very unconvincing. He says the idea is terrible because our servicemen will not be able to be ambassadors for the US in the communities where they are stationed. That's rubbish because we're still going to keep a presence in these places, just not as large.
Says Englin "But the damage that Bush's proposal could do to America's relations with its allies is beyond dispute. There is no easy public-relations substitute for 100,000 Americans living in the heart of Europe and serving as ambassadors to and from their host countries. If you think Americans and Europeans have trouble getting along now, just wait." What a crock! It is beyond dispute that this COULD have negative effects and that is the reason the drawback should not occur! What a convoluted reason to do nothing. It is undeniable that you MIGHT get in a car wreck if you drive home, should you walk instead? Besides, part of the problem of the heavy troop presence without a menacing USSR is that it smacks of American imperialism to the left-wing dopes in Europe. They hate American soldiers on (misbegotten) principle, so whose hearts and minds really are going to change?
Then again, Englin says, we've had problems when US servicemen violate local customs or commit crimes against the locals. Quite simply, this equivocating "proof" cannot make this idea terrible.
Second, he complains that "following through on these promises to military families [to bring them home to the US] will require significant changes at the Pentagon, which is not known for its rapid institutional dexterity." That's part of the farging point of this whole transformation -- get the Pentagon off it's institutional rear end and make it a more flexible and reactive organization.
But also, Englin says, some military families like to stay in Europe or other overseas places. SO? Most probably do not, and considering that the reduction level will be about 70% of overseas forces coming home, the other 30% can be comprised of people who wanted the overseas assignments.
Put simply, Englin calls for doing nothing because doing something might have short-term problems. That's not progress, initiative, adaptability or foresight and it's not the American way.
Today, two more op-eds of note. First, Victor Davis Hanson, who has been advocating this move for years, has this editorial praising the Bush plan and notes the unwitting negatives that were caused by our heavy troop presence in Europe for 60 years:
The real significance, inasmuch as many airbases and depots will stay, is symbolic and psycho-sociological. Unwittingly, we had created an unhealthy passive-aggressiveness in Europe that clinicians might identify as a classic symptom of dependency. Europe — now larger and more populous than the United States — has reduced defense investment to subsidize a variety of social expenditures found nowhere in the world. So insular had its utopians become under the aegis of NATO's subsidized protection that it was increasingly convinced that the ubiquitous United States was the world's rogue nation, the last impediment to a 35-hour work week, cradle-to-grave subsidies, and wind power the world over.
A once-muscular and hallowed NATO has become a Potemkin alliance. The more jetting grandees praised the "historic role of the Trans-Atlantic partnership," the more its logic dictated that it would deploy only where there were no enemies of the West — parading and maneuvering where there were never dangers, bickering and recriminating about going where there always were.
And Charles Krauthammer whacks the critics in today's WaPo:
The Democrats' response is a classic demonstration of reactionary liberalism, the reflexive defense of the status quo long after its raison d'être has evaporated. John Kerry adviser Wesley Clark protested vigorously: "As we face a global war on terror with Al Qaeda active in more than 60 countries, now is not the time to pull-back our forces."
He cannot be serious. How exactly are the 72,000 American troops in Germany fighting al Qaeda? A lot of good they did in uncovering the al Qaeda cell in Hamburg that carried out the Sept. 11 attacks. This hugely expensive deployment -- with its large logistics tail and tens of thousands of dependents added to the bill -- could be put to infinitely better use elsewhere.
Critics are particularly vociferous about drawing down 12,500 of our troops in South Korea. We all know what our troops are doing there. They are intended to be sitting ducks. Thirty-seven thousand Americans are not going to repel a million-man North Korean army. Their purpose is to die in the first hours of a North Korean invasion -- setting off a tripwire that forces the United States to enter the war.
* * *
John Kerry claims that withdrawing troops will send "the wrong signal" in a confrontation with North Korea over its nuclear weapons. Where was he when the Clinton administration sent a signal of abject surrender to the North Koreans by offering two shiny new nuclear reactors, oil shipments and all kinds of diplomatic goodies in return for a paper promise to freeze their nuclear program -- which they now brazenly and proudly claim to have broken long ago?
Ralph Peters also favors the withdrawal.
And John Kerry's been clear on his position on this. He's against it, less than three weeks after he was for it.
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