Another Dhimmi Carter Blunder

This is one is from 1979 but its effects still reverberate today.

An idiotic policy that prevents generals, admirals and senior defense officials from visiting Taiwan that originated in the Carter Administration is hurting deterrence in the Taiwan Straits today. From the NRO:

Although China will object to allowing U.S. general and flag officers in Taiwan, the proposal would not violate the existing American policy toward China and Taiwan. The current restrictions on visits to Taiwan by general officers are based on “guidelines” issued by the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian Affairs in 1979 following the Carter administration’s decision to end formal relations with Taiwan and establish them with Communist China. But the restrictions were not part of any formal agreement with China, nor was it in response to any particular demand by Beijing. In short, this is a self-imposed proscription which has not been properly reexamined in light of either America’s obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act or the growth of a much more capable Chinese military force. Indeed, permitting U.S. generals and flag officers to visit Taiwan would reaffirm the essentials of America’s one-China policy: While the United States does not endorse any specific political outcome on unification, it is also committed to preventing the mainland from attempts to annex the island by force.

The American policy of deterring Beijing from using military force against Taiwan and reassuring Taipei in its dealings with the mainland has facilitated peace and great cross-straits economic growth for decades. But it is a policy that is increasingly put in jeopardy by the ongoing development of China’s military power. Removing an outdated restriction on defense cooperation with Taiwan is a sensible step to take now in light of this new threat. The idea that generals and admirals can travel to China, Libya, and Uzbekistan but not Taiwan is a restriction that is not only ridiculous on its face but, increasingly, dangerous to the very men and women who will be asked to risk their lives should deterrence fail.

Any mainland invasion will likely be very, very costly for the PRC (unless Taiwan capitulates quickly) and its success is hardly foreordained but given Beijing's buildup in recent years as well as an unhealthy obsession with the Taiwan question make an invasion at some point a real possibility. A strong U.S.-Taiwan (and preferably Japan) partnership will make it less likely that Beijing will embark on a catastrophic adventure. Stronger deterrence today is better than having to throw the Chicomms off the beach.